Cloning Of Humans Issue
The recent news of the successful cloning of an adult sheep-in which the
sheep's
DNA was inserted into an unfertilized sheep egg to produce a lamb
with identical
DNA-has generated an outpouring of ethical concerns. These
concerns are not
about Dolly, the now famous sheep, nor even about the
considerable impact
cloning may have on the animal breeding industry, but
rather about the
possibility of cloning humans. For the most part, however,
the ethical concerns
being raised are exaggerated and misplaced, because they
are based on erroneous
views about what genes are and what they can do. The
danger, therefore, lies not
in the power of the technology, but in the
misunderstanding of its significance.
Producing a clone of a human being
would not amount to creating a "carbon
copy"-an automaton of the sort
familiar from science fiction. It would be
more like producing a delayed
identical twin. And just as identical twins are
two separate
people-biologically, psychologically, morally and legally, though
not
genetically so a clone is a separate person from his or
her
non-contemporaneous twin. To think otherwise is to embrace a belief in
genetic
determinism-the view that genes determine everything about us, and
that
environmental factors or the random events in human development are
utterly
insignificant. The overwhelming consensus among geneticists is that
genetic
determinism is false. As geneticists have come to understand the ways
in which
genes operate, they have also become aware of the myriad ways in
which the
environment affects their "expression." The genetic contribution
to
the simplest physical traits, such as height and hair color, is
significantly
mediated by environmental factors. And even even the most
enthusiastic genetic
researchers to be limited and indirect concede the
genetic contribution to the
traits we value most deeply, from intelligence to
compassion. Indeed, we need
only appeal to our ordinary experience with
identical twins-that they are
different people despite their similarities-to
appreciate that genetic
determinism is false. Furthermore, because of the
extra steps involved, cloning
will probably always be riskier-that is, less
likely to result in a live
birth-than in vitro fertilization (IVF) and embryo
transfer. (It took more than
275 attempts before the researchers were
able to obtain a successful sheep
clone. While cloning methods may improve,
we should note that even standard IVF
techniques typically have a success
rate of less than 20 percent.) So why would
anyone go to the trouble of
cloning? There are, of course, a few reasons people
might go to the trouble,
and so it's worth pondering what they think they might
accomplish, and what
sort of ethical quandaries they might engender. Consider
the hypothetical
example of the couple who wants to replace a child who has
died. The couple
doesn't seek to have another child the ordinary way because
they feel that
cloning would enable them to reproduce, as it were, the lost
child. But the
unavoidable truth is that they would be producing an entirely
different
person, a delayed identical twin of that child. Once they understood
that, it
is unlikely they would persist. But suppose they were to persist? Of
course
we can't deny that possibility. But a couple so persistent in refusing
to
acknowledge the genetic facts is not likely to be daunted by
ethical
considerations or legal restrictions either. If our fear is that
there could be
many couples with that sort of psychology, then we have a
great deal more than
cloning to worry about. Another disturbing possibility
is the person who wants a
clone in order to have acceptable "spare parts" in
case he or she
needs an organ transplant later in life. But regardless of the
reason that
someone has a clone produced, the result would nevertheless be a
human being
with all the rights and protections that accompany that status.
It truly would
be a disaster if the results of human cloning were seen as
less than fully
human. But there is certainly no moral justification for and
little social
danger of that happening; after all, we do not accord lesser
status to children
who have been created through IVF or embryo transfer.
There are other
possibilities we could spin out. Suppose a couple wants a
"designer
child"-a clone of Cindy Crawford or Elizabeth Taylor-because they
want a
daughter whom will grow up to be as attractive as those women. Indeed,
suppose
someone wants a clone, never mind of whom, simply to enjoy the
notoriety of
having one. We cannot rule out such cases as impossible. Some
people produce
children for all sorts of frivolous or contemptible reasons.
But we must
remember that cloning is not as easy as going to a video store or
as engaging as
the traditional way of making babies. Given the physical and
emotional burdens
that cloning would involve, it is likely that such cases
would be exceedingly
rare. But if that is so, why object to a ban on human
cloning? What is wrong
with placing a legal barrier in the path of those with
desires perverse enough
or delusions recalcitrant enough to seek cloning
despite its limited potential
and formidable costs? For one thing, these are
just the people that a legal ban
would be least likely to deter. But more
important, a legal barrier might well
make cloning appear more promising than
it is to a much larger group of people.
If there were significant
interest in applying this technology to human beings,
it would indicate a
failure to educate people that genetic determinism is
profoundly mistaken.
Under those circumstances as well, however, a ban on human
cloning would not
only be ineffective but also most likely counterproductive.
Ineffective
because, as others have pointed out, the technology does not seem to
require
sophisticated and highly visible laboratory facilities; cloning could
easily
go underground. Counterproductive because a ban might encourage people
to
believe that there is a scientific basis for some of the popular
fears
associated with human cloning-that there is something to genetic
determinism
after all. There is a consensus among both geneticists and those
writing on
ethical, legal and social aspects of genetic research. Genetic
determinism is
not only false, but also pernicious; it invokes memories of
pseudo-scientific
racist and eugenic programs premised on the belief that
what we value in people
is entirely dependent on their genetic endowment or
the color of their skin.
Though most members of our society now eschew
racial determinism, our culture
still assumes that genes contain a person's
destiny. It would be unfortunate if,
by treating cloning as a terribly
dangerous technology, we encouraged this
cultural myth, even as we intrude on
the broad freedom our society grants people
regarding reproduction. We should
remember that most of us believe people should
be allowed to decide with whom
to reproduce, when to reproduce and how many
children they should have. We do
not criticize a woman who takes a fertility
drug so that she can influence
when she has children-or even how many. Why,
then, would we object if a woman
decides to give birth to a child who is, in
effect, a non-contemporaneous
identical twin of someone else? By arguing against
a ban, I am not claiming
that there are no serious ethical concerns to the
manipulation of human
genes. Indeed there are. For example, if it turned out
that certain desirable
traits regarding intellectual abilities or character
could be realized
through the manipulation of human genes, which of these
enhancements, if any,
should be available? But such questions are about genetic
engineering, which
is a different issue than cloning. Cloning is a crude method
of trait
selection: It simply takes a pre-existing, un-engineered genetic
combination
of traits and replicates it. I do not wish to dismiss the ethical
concerns
people have raised regarding the broad range of assisted
reproductive
technologies. But we should acknowledge that those concerns
would not be
resolved by any determination we make regarding the specific
acceptability of
cloning.